Citizenship is among the most important political institutions in any nation. It determines who belongs to the political community, who enjoys its protections, who owes it allegiance, and who will ultimately help shape its future.
Yet there is surprisingly little agreement regarding the principles upon which citizenship ought to rest.
Should citizenship be acquired automatically by birth within a nation's territory? Should it be inherited through ancestry and descent? Should it be earned through naturalization, cultural assimilation, or demonstrated loyalty to the nation? Is citizenship primarily a legal status, a cultural inheritance, a political membership, or some combination of these things?
Throughout history, different societies have answered these questions in different ways. Some have emphasized birthplace. Others have emphasized lineage, culture, language, religion, or civic commitment.
Our founder, Alfred Cromwell, does not believe that birth within a country's borders, by itself, is a sufficient basis for citizenship. For example, he believes those born to illegal alien parents should not get citizenship, and he also believes in citizenship tied to the father, since "patria" in Latin means "fatherland". Put bluntly, "you are who your father is." He also believes that there should be religious tests to hold public office. His justification? The North Carolina Constitution of 1776, which contained a provision disqualifying from office those who denied the truth of the Protestant religion or the divine authority of the Old and New Testaments.
Similarly, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 required declarations of Christian belief for certain officeholders.
So, citizenship in some states was very much tied to religion, historically.
However, this discussion has not been created merely to repeat a predetermined conclusion. Members are encouraged to defend, challenge, refine, or reject that position through reasoned argument. City Tutoring itself does not hold a position, since some of us at the staff level hold somewhat different views.
What, in your view, is the proper basis of citizenship? Do you agree with Cromwell's position?
What makes a person a member of a nation?
And what obligations, if any, do nations owe to future generations when determining the answer?
What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
This is such a multifaceted question and in a sense mathematical as well. I cannot help but liken this to Abstract Algebra; there are many kinds of algebraic structures such as groups, fields, rings and more - yet there are stringent laws preserving the distinctness between them. However it may be argued that certain algebraic structures are closer to some than other. For example semi-groups to groups than magmas to groups. Furthermore it is not clear how narrow or wide one's perspective is; is the citizenship debate on the scale of differentiating fields and groups or is it on the scale of differentiating groups that are Abelian or not.
But I believe Mr Cromwell's impulse in defining a citizen of a nation is generally correct. In our modern globalised world, citizenship of developed Western nations has become a commodity and resident foreigners once acquiring a passport superficially pronounce themselves as true inheritors of that country's patrimony, while inwardly (an understatement) practice their old religion and culture. When one's heritage is being auctioned off, who can blame for their hatred of mass immigration? Among Twitter circles, this immigration debate can be thought of as divided into two camps on the conservative side: Civic nationalism and ethnonationalism. The former emphasising that an assimilated foreigner may become part of the national family whereas the latter maintain that citizenship is passed through blood.
In my opinion, the true and biblical view lies in between. The scriptures do not shy away from ethnic distinctions with the nation of Israel being set apart from others with laws forbidding miscegenation. However this nation was not set apart due to their genetic makeup, but their faith in God. Moreover it is my belief that the Church catholic (lowercase c) is the continuation of Israel whose membership demands faith in Christ. That said, we are not Marcionites and hence should heed God's actions in the Old Testament as well. God's holiness in a sense was embodied in the Mosaic law and the distinctness of Israel, even within Israel the Levites were set apart to be priests of God. But again, gentiles could join the nation of Israel, and even if they did not, were granted equal treatment under the law for the Jews themselves were foreigners in Egypt. Ultimately I believe John the Baptist and the Apostle Paul put it best: "And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham" (Mt 3:9) and "Boast not against the branches. But if thou boast, thou bearest not the root, but the root thee." (Ro 11:18)
Nations were created by the providence of God and were given lands to call their own. Though we are totally depraved and corrupt as a result of original sin, we cannot view all of nature in this lens. Things become evil when they are estranged from God e.g. love becoming lust. But our human conscience though flawed and imperfect is indeed from God and is a grace given to all, both elect and non-elect. The idea of distinct nations, though imperfect, are not evil at their core.
In practice, I believe a nation reserves the right to restrict immigration in the future on the basis of: culture, ethnicity, skill or religion. There is no sin in any of those choices because immigration law is the prerogative of the state, but there is a sin in uncontrolled mass immigration against the wishes of populace resulting ultimately in demographic replacement. However a nation cannot and should not infringe on the rights of a citizen who obtained citizenship prior to these hypothetical changes for not fitting the new changes, that is a grave sin in of itself. The nation should not have the right to rescind citizenship either on the sole basis of ethnicity either. A nation may also instil and empower Christian principles in law, which would cause many culturally incompatible people to leave any way. A nation should be a recognisable and distinct entity but it is entirely possible for law-abiding and God-fearing immigrants to be grafted in - it is a sin to unjustly persecute them and it is a sin for them to not graciously and totally assimilate.
But I believe Mr Cromwell's impulse in defining a citizen of a nation is generally correct. In our modern globalised world, citizenship of developed Western nations has become a commodity and resident foreigners once acquiring a passport superficially pronounce themselves as true inheritors of that country's patrimony, while inwardly (an understatement) practice their old religion and culture. When one's heritage is being auctioned off, who can blame for their hatred of mass immigration? Among Twitter circles, this immigration debate can be thought of as divided into two camps on the conservative side: Civic nationalism and ethnonationalism. The former emphasising that an assimilated foreigner may become part of the national family whereas the latter maintain that citizenship is passed through blood.
In my opinion, the true and biblical view lies in between. The scriptures do not shy away from ethnic distinctions with the nation of Israel being set apart from others with laws forbidding miscegenation. However this nation was not set apart due to their genetic makeup, but their faith in God. Moreover it is my belief that the Church catholic (lowercase c) is the continuation of Israel whose membership demands faith in Christ. That said, we are not Marcionites and hence should heed God's actions in the Old Testament as well. God's holiness in a sense was embodied in the Mosaic law and the distinctness of Israel, even within Israel the Levites were set apart to be priests of God. But again, gentiles could join the nation of Israel, and even if they did not, were granted equal treatment under the law for the Jews themselves were foreigners in Egypt. Ultimately I believe John the Baptist and the Apostle Paul put it best: "And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham" (Mt 3:9) and "Boast not against the branches. But if thou boast, thou bearest not the root, but the root thee." (Ro 11:18)
Nations were created by the providence of God and were given lands to call their own. Though we are totally depraved and corrupt as a result of original sin, we cannot view all of nature in this lens. Things become evil when they are estranged from God e.g. love becoming lust. But our human conscience though flawed and imperfect is indeed from God and is a grace given to all, both elect and non-elect. The idea of distinct nations, though imperfect, are not evil at their core.
In practice, I believe a nation reserves the right to restrict immigration in the future on the basis of: culture, ethnicity, skill or religion. There is no sin in any of those choices because immigration law is the prerogative of the state, but there is a sin in uncontrolled mass immigration against the wishes of populace resulting ultimately in demographic replacement. However a nation cannot and should not infringe on the rights of a citizen who obtained citizenship prior to these hypothetical changes for not fitting the new changes, that is a grave sin in of itself. The nation should not have the right to rescind citizenship either on the sole basis of ethnicity either. A nation may also instil and empower Christian principles in law, which would cause many culturally incompatible people to leave any way. A nation should be a recognisable and distinct entity but it is entirely possible for law-abiding and God-fearing immigrants to be grafted in - it is a sin to unjustly persecute them and it is a sin for them to not graciously and totally assimilate.
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nyquistfrequency
- Posts: 36
- Joined: Thu Jun 11, 2026 3:46 pm
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
What koentek said reminds me of the race of the soul.
"The body is the externality of the soul and the soul is the race seen from the inside."
However, "there are many cases of people who are exactly of the same race of the body, of the same tribe, sometimes even, brothers or fathers and sons, of the same blood in the most real sense, but who nevertheless fail to understand each other. A barrier separates their souls, their way of feeling and seeing is different, and the common race of the body and common blood can do nothing about that. A possibility of comprehension exists, and therefore of true solidarity, of deep unity, only where a common “race of the soul” exists."
This article does a decent summary:
https://gornahoor.net/?p=8105
It is always the case that like seeks like, however, racial purity is not purely physical. So how does one integrate or select for members of a nation in the natal sense? How does one prevent a decline in racial quality?
"The body is the externality of the soul and the soul is the race seen from the inside."
However, "there are many cases of people who are exactly of the same race of the body, of the same tribe, sometimes even, brothers or fathers and sons, of the same blood in the most real sense, but who nevertheless fail to understand each other. A barrier separates their souls, their way of feeling and seeing is different, and the common race of the body and common blood can do nothing about that. A possibility of comprehension exists, and therefore of true solidarity, of deep unity, only where a common “race of the soul” exists."
This article does a decent summary:
https://gornahoor.net/?p=8105
It is always the case that like seeks like, however, racial purity is not purely physical. So how does one integrate or select for members of a nation in the natal sense? How does one prevent a decline in racial quality?
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
Thank you for informing me of the concept of the race of the soul, it is the first time I have come across that. It is undeniable that en masse a group of a particular ethnos gives rise to a particular culture — the extent to which this culture can be said to be downstream of genetics, I do not know.nyquistfrequency wrote: Sat Jun 13, 2026 9:16 am What koentek said reminds me of the race of the soul.
"The body is the externality of the soul and the soul is the race seen from the inside."
However, "there are many cases of people who are exactly of the same race of the body, of the same tribe, sometimes even, brothers or fathers and sons, of the same blood in the most real sense, but who nevertheless fail to understand each other. A barrier separates their souls, their way of feeling and seeing is different, and the common race of the body and common blood can do nothing about that. A possibility of comprehension exists, and therefore of true solidarity, of deep unity, only where a common “race of the soul” exists."
This article does a decent summary:
https://gornahoor.net/?p=8105
It is always the case that like seeks like, however, racial purity is not purely physical. So how does one integrate or select for members of a nation in the natal sense? How does one prevent a decline in racial quality?
Truthfully, I have not delved deep into ethnonationalist circles but a general truth I see be implied is that not every single member of a race exhibits behaviours characteristic of that race yet I have never seen a metaphysical explanation to why that may be the case.
Ultimately I defer to scripture which I believe does indeed group individual members of nations together e.g. the collective punishment of Egypt in Book of Exodus. But ultimately the Imago Dei and the stain of Original Sin greatly diminish the credit that can be given to prosperity arising from one's race.
Nyquistfrequency, what do you think of the division of humans into biological races?
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nyquistfrequency
- Posts: 36
- Joined: Thu Jun 11, 2026 3:46 pm
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
The body and station one is born into is an expression or symbol of some incorporeal essence. Which was the reason for the caste system in India. Naturally, this is the same with races, every corporeal manifestation is an approximation of some aspect of a higher order. Absolute absence is the definition of impossible and lacks all reality, so experience must continue after bodily death. However, one dies and is reborn in every moment, so what currently conditions the continuity of this life will condition the next. The soul (a particular individual essence) will find the world proper to its perceptual conditioning. Siddhartha Gautama was born a prince, Srinivasa Ramanujan was born a Brahmin. However, there are many incompetents born of high status and many geniuses of low birth, how does one explain this? This is what I suspect has happened, the mixing has gotten to the point where nearly everyone has fragments of noble blood, yet few have the capacity to use it to its full potential. The opposite can be true as well, if the biology is malfunctioning, it can no longer reflect the soul's intent properly. It can also be the case that one can unlock latent capacities (siddhis) by resolving some ignorance (original sin).Koentek wrote: Sat Jun 13, 2026 3:29 pmThank you for informing me of the concept of the race of the soul, it is the first time I have come across that. It is undeniable that en masse a group of a particular ethnos gives rise to a particular culture — the extent to which this culture can be said to be downstream of genetics, I do not know.nyquistfrequency wrote: Sat Jun 13, 2026 9:16 am What koentek said reminds me of the race of the soul.
"The body is the externality of the soul and the soul is the race seen from the inside."
However, "there are many cases of people who are exactly of the same race of the body, of the same tribe, sometimes even, brothers or fathers and sons, of the same blood in the most real sense, but who nevertheless fail to understand each other. A barrier separates their souls, their way of feeling and seeing is different, and the common race of the body and common blood can do nothing about that. A possibility of comprehension exists, and therefore of true solidarity, of deep unity, only where a common “race of the soul” exists."
This article does a decent summary:
https://gornahoor.net/?p=8105
It is always the case that like seeks like, however, racial purity is not purely physical. So how does one integrate or select for members of a nation in the natal sense? How does one prevent a decline in racial quality?
Truthfully, I have not delved deep into ethnonationalist circles but a general truth I see be implied is that not every single member of a race exhibits behaviours characteristic of that race yet I have never seen a metaphysical explanation to why that may be the case.
Ultimately I defer to scripture which I believe does indeed group individual members of nations together e.g. the collective punishment of Egypt in Book of Exodus. But ultimately the Imago Dei and the stain of Original Sin greatly diminish the credit that can be given to prosperity arising from one's race.
Nyquistfrequency, what do you think of the division of humans into biological races?
This is just somewhat speculative so far.
"It is certainly true that all composite substances are liable to decomposition: that this decomposition, when it takes place in the animal world, is called death: and that the human body is a substance compounded of the four elements. But it is also true that the elements of Paradise, where man is created, are not subject to this law, seeing that they are most pure and incorruptible heavenly essences; and if man had remained in this pure and celestial region, his body would be incapable of natural decay. Adam, however, in an evil day for our race, disobeyed the Creator, and straightaway was driven forth to the beasts, into the world of corruptible elements which God had created for the beasts only. From that day forward his food was derived from perishable substances, and death began to work in his members. The pure elements of his creation were gradually mingled and infected with the corruptible elements of the outer world and thus his body became more and more gross, and liable, through its grossness, to natural decay and death. The process of degeneration was, of course, slow in the case of Adam and his first descendants; but, as time went on, the seed out of which men were generated became more and more infected with perishable elements. The continued use of corruptible food rendered their bodies more and more gross - and human life was soon shortened to a very brief span indeed."
There is no evolution, life involved, percipitated/solidified out of an amorphous superbeing, pure potential became more and more constrained by form, things were previously less physical less substance and more essence, less successive "how" (perishable) and more simultaneous "why" (immutable). So a bacterium did not evolve into a fish did not evolve into a monkey which evolved into a human. This "evolution" would mean one could derive the whole from the part which is impossible. A thing cannot become other than what it is. Rather the ape is the degeneration of the human.
Adaptation is always a specialization and therefore a limitation of scope/potential. Mutation is simply a degeneration. All forms of specialization implies loss of potential, one cannot specialize one's way to an increased capacity. The degeneration catalyzed by inbreeding is already present on a macro scale, all biology is a machine trying to repair itself while forgetting itself. This is the case with aging and cancer is forgetting at a cellular level. All degeneration is forgetting the principle which governs one existence. We can see that this theory immediately aligns to the long lifespans mentioned in the bible, things were not as solidified and mechanized, there was a greater connection to God so people lived longer, possessed greater health, probably also had remarkable healing abilities, since nothing was forgotten it could simply be regenerated.
What we see of the various races are various stages of degeneration, apes are degenerated humans and monkeys are degenerated apes. It's called the descent of man and not the ascent of man for a reason. So this presents the character of a racial hierarchy of those closer to the Principle and those further away.
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
There's a YouTube channel that more or less touched on this with a recent video titled "What is an American": https://youtu.be/MIGI9h7RiCc?si=LDr0YtXlCIOoj6Le.
The creator is not Christian and approaches this from a "biological" point of view. Still, I think he made several good points.
Personally, I would be satisfied with Cromwell's idea of patrilineal citizenship, as my son is half white American, half Chinese.
The creator is not Christian and approaches this from a "biological" point of view. Still, I think he made several good points.
Personally, I would be satisfied with Cromwell's idea of patrilineal citizenship, as my son is half white American, half Chinese.
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Casus_Conscientiae
- Posts: 27
- Joined: Mon Jun 08, 2026 11:39 am
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
I claim that the right of voting and holding public office is an essential and sine qua non part of the dividing line between a citizen and an alien, and not just merely an honorable perquisite of citizenship. I will attempt later on, Deo volente, to prove this rigorously.
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Casus_Conscientiae
- Posts: 27
- Joined: Mon Jun 08, 2026 11:39 am
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
A Few Words on the Civil Liberties of Women (Part 1)
I have an important theorem for you concerning the civil liberties of the female sex!!!
Theorem. If even a single claim asserting that women should be deprived of the vote because women as a class exercise political judgment in a manner harmful or unfit for the polity happens to be irrefutably or historically true, well then it follows also that every legal system which allows women to retain the following civil capacities while denying suffrage is inconsistent and therefore legally irrational: property ownership; contract; inheritance; guardianship; testimony in court; legal personhood.
Proposition 1. Voting is only one species of civil authority exercised by a legal person. Proof: Voting is a juridical act by which a citizen participates in: selection of magistrates; formation of public law. But other legal acts also participate in the civil order, including: litigation (which helps to enforce the law); transferring property; binding contracts; exercising guardianship; and giving legal testimony. All these acts influence civil order. Therefore voting is only one instance of civil agency. QED
Proposition 2. Every sort of persons each of whom are unfit for civil judgment, are also ipso jure legally incapacitated from all acts requiring civil judgment. Proof: The reason given against granting the suffrage to women is because women’s political or civil judgment produces undesirable outcomes. But civil judgment is the same rational faculty used when a person: signs contracts; manages property; testifies in court; serves as guardian of minors; files lawsuits. QED
Proposition 3. Each and every one the civil liberties listed is intrinsically contingent upon the same legal competence as suffrage. Proof: Each requires that the individual be treated as a fully competent legal person: Ownership → authority over property rights recognized by law; Contract → authority to create legally binding obligations; Inheritance → authority to acquire property through law; Guardianship → authority over another person under civil law; Testimony → authority to influence judicial decisions; Legal personhood → presumption of autonomous civil agency. Thus every one of these liberties presupposes the same legal status that suffrage presupposes: independent civic agency. QED
Proposition 4. If suffrage must be removed because women misuse civic agency, the same reason removes all other civic agency. Proof: Let the reason for repeal be: women as a class exercise civic judgment in ways harmful to the polity. But that judgment is exercised whenever any citizen: enforces his own rights; enters contracts; manages property; influences courts; or controls dependents. Thus allowing those while denying voting would contradict the stated reason. Therefore the same principle requires removing them. QED
Ergo: If even a single claim asserting that women should be deprived of the vote because women as a class exercise political judgment in a manner harmful or unfit for the polity happens to be irrefutably or historically true, well then it follows also that every legal system which allows women to retain the following civil capacities while denying suffrage is inconsistent and therefore legally irrational: property ownership; contract; inheritance; guardianship; testimony in court; legal personhood. QED
Corollary. The reason is simple: A legal system must choose one of two coherent models: Model A — Civic Personhood. Women possess full civil agency → voting follows naturally. Model B — Civic Incapacity. Women lack civil agency → all independent legal rights must disappear. There is no stable middle position where women are: competent to own property, competent to bind contracts, competent to influence courts, yet incompetent to cast a ballot.
Objection: The argument applies only to married women, since they are under male headship. It does not apply to widows, who are no longer under a husband and therefore may exercise civil liberties without contradiction.
Answer: I have yet a few more propositions explaining why this objection cannot be accepted.
Proposition 5. If the reason for denying suffrage is based on female nature or judgment as such, then it applies equally to widows. Proof: The premise of the antisuffrage claim is: women as a class exercise political judgment in a harmful or unfit way. This judgment is not conditioned on: marital status, headship of a husband, household subordination, but on sex itself. A widow remains: biologically female, respectively possesses or lacks the same rational faculties she respectively possessed or lacked when married, statistically part of the same voting class. Therefore the ground of disqualification remains unchanged. QED
Proposition 6. Even if widowhood removes the occasion for marital subordination, yet it does not remove the faculty whose alleged misuse justifies disenfranchisement. Proof: Two distinct bases for restricting women must be distinguished: (1): Subordination-based (marital headship) → applies only within marriage. (2): Capacity-based (defect or misuse of judgment) → applies to the person as such. The objection attempts to move from (2) back to (1), but the antisuffrage argument clearly rests on (2): it cites voting behavior, not marital hierarchy. Therefore the disqualification is grounded in judgment, not marital/conjugal subordination. But widowhood removes only marital subordination, not judgment. Therefore it cannot remove the disqualification. QED
Proposition 7. If widows retain full civil liberties, then the premise of incapacity is implicitly denied. Proof: If widows are allowed to: own property; enter contracts; act as guardians; testify in court; litigate; then the law affirms that they possess: sufficient rational competence for binding, socially consequential decisions. But these are the same faculties required for voting. Thus: Either widows are competent → then suffrage cannot be denied on grounds of incapacity; Or widows are incompetent → then all civil liberties must be removed. Allowing one while denying the other is a contradiction. QED
Proposition 8. There is no principled basis for distinguishing widows from unmarried women under a capacity-based objection. Proof: The alleged defect (harmful political judgment) belongs to neither marriage, nor dependence, but to sexed cognition or disposition, which is shared ex hypothesi by all women alike whether married or widowed. Thus every restriction grounded in that defect must apply universally to all adult women. QED
Therefore the above objection is invalid. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Rebuttal to 2 Objections.
Objection #1. "In your very first proposition - 'All these acts influence civil order'. Before you gallop to QED, 'influence' is a tenuous claim to make; both inherently and the degree. I didn't read the remainder, the first one was already erroneous. Women shouldn't vote but shouldn't be restricted from the other activities."
Answer. The argument doesn’t depend on how much each act “influences civil order,” so challenging that word doesn’t touch the core point.
The key issue is that voting, contracting, owning property, testifying, and acting as a guardian all require the exercise of the same kind of rational, legally recognized judgment.
If women are deemed unfit for voting because their judgment is defective, then that same judgment would also be defective in contracts, testimony, and property decisions.
To maintain your position, you would need to show that voting requires a fundamentally different or higher kind of rational capacity than those other acts—not simply assert that it “influences” society more.
Thus the real point of my proposition #1 is: Voting is one species of civil agency, in that it requires the exercise of rational judgment recognized by law. Other acts—such as contracting, owning property, testifying, and guardianship—also require that same recognized capacity for judgment. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Objection #2. "Voting was historically not seen as a natural right. It wasn't universally granted to all men either. But nobody ever suggested that men who were ineligible to vote should be ineligible to own or transfer property, inherit, litigate, or form contracts. The fundamental difference here is legal agency over one's own private affairs, vs legal power over others' affairs. Testimony and guardianship are intermediate cases, but even so, an unmarried woman's natural right of parental guardianship (distinct from court-ordered legal guardianship) over her own children, born out of wedlock, was recognized. (Of course, this was contingent on her bearing sole financial responsibility for those children.) I think that this well-established, uncontroversial historical distinction (applied to men as well as women) can provide a basis for removing women from political and institutional power, while still leaving them as legal persons (femme covert vs femme sole)."
Answer. The distinction between “private affairs” and “power over others” doesn’t hold, because the so-called private rights—contract, property, testimony, and guardianship—all involve legally recognized power over other persons.
A contract binds others, property excludes others, testimony can determine legal outcomes, and guardianship is direct authority over another person. These are not merely self-regarding acts.
So the difference between these and voting is not one of kind, but of degree.
If women are said to be unfit for voting because their judgment is defective, then that same judgment is being exercised in these other domains.
As for disenfranchised men, their exclusion was typically not based on alleged incapacity, but on property or status qualifications. That places such exclusions in a different category—conventional or arbitrary—not grounded in competence.
So the argument stands: a capacity-based objection to women’s suffrage cannot be limited to voting alone without inconsistency. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Please attempt to prove that any one of these propositions is invalid if you can !!!!
I have an important theorem for you concerning the civil liberties of the female sex!!!
Theorem. If even a single claim asserting that women should be deprived of the vote because women as a class exercise political judgment in a manner harmful or unfit for the polity happens to be irrefutably or historically true, well then it follows also that every legal system which allows women to retain the following civil capacities while denying suffrage is inconsistent and therefore legally irrational: property ownership; contract; inheritance; guardianship; testimony in court; legal personhood.
Proposition 1. Voting is only one species of civil authority exercised by a legal person. Proof: Voting is a juridical act by which a citizen participates in: selection of magistrates; formation of public law. But other legal acts also participate in the civil order, including: litigation (which helps to enforce the law); transferring property; binding contracts; exercising guardianship; and giving legal testimony. All these acts influence civil order. Therefore voting is only one instance of civil agency. QED
Proposition 2. Every sort of persons each of whom are unfit for civil judgment, are also ipso jure legally incapacitated from all acts requiring civil judgment. Proof: The reason given against granting the suffrage to women is because women’s political or civil judgment produces undesirable outcomes. But civil judgment is the same rational faculty used when a person: signs contracts; manages property; testifies in court; serves as guardian of minors; files lawsuits. QED
Proposition 3. Each and every one the civil liberties listed is intrinsically contingent upon the same legal competence as suffrage. Proof: Each requires that the individual be treated as a fully competent legal person: Ownership → authority over property rights recognized by law; Contract → authority to create legally binding obligations; Inheritance → authority to acquire property through law; Guardianship → authority over another person under civil law; Testimony → authority to influence judicial decisions; Legal personhood → presumption of autonomous civil agency. Thus every one of these liberties presupposes the same legal status that suffrage presupposes: independent civic agency. QED
Proposition 4. If suffrage must be removed because women misuse civic agency, the same reason removes all other civic agency. Proof: Let the reason for repeal be: women as a class exercise civic judgment in ways harmful to the polity. But that judgment is exercised whenever any citizen: enforces his own rights; enters contracts; manages property; influences courts; or controls dependents. Thus allowing those while denying voting would contradict the stated reason. Therefore the same principle requires removing them. QED
Ergo: If even a single claim asserting that women should be deprived of the vote because women as a class exercise political judgment in a manner harmful or unfit for the polity happens to be irrefutably or historically true, well then it follows also that every legal system which allows women to retain the following civil capacities while denying suffrage is inconsistent and therefore legally irrational: property ownership; contract; inheritance; guardianship; testimony in court; legal personhood. QED
Corollary. The reason is simple: A legal system must choose one of two coherent models: Model A — Civic Personhood. Women possess full civil agency → voting follows naturally. Model B — Civic Incapacity. Women lack civil agency → all independent legal rights must disappear. There is no stable middle position where women are: competent to own property, competent to bind contracts, competent to influence courts, yet incompetent to cast a ballot.
Objection: The argument applies only to married women, since they are under male headship. It does not apply to widows, who are no longer under a husband and therefore may exercise civil liberties without contradiction.
Answer: I have yet a few more propositions explaining why this objection cannot be accepted.
Proposition 5. If the reason for denying suffrage is based on female nature or judgment as such, then it applies equally to widows. Proof: The premise of the antisuffrage claim is: women as a class exercise political judgment in a harmful or unfit way. This judgment is not conditioned on: marital status, headship of a husband, household subordination, but on sex itself. A widow remains: biologically female, respectively possesses or lacks the same rational faculties she respectively possessed or lacked when married, statistically part of the same voting class. Therefore the ground of disqualification remains unchanged. QED
Proposition 6. Even if widowhood removes the occasion for marital subordination, yet it does not remove the faculty whose alleged misuse justifies disenfranchisement. Proof: Two distinct bases for restricting women must be distinguished: (1): Subordination-based (marital headship) → applies only within marriage. (2): Capacity-based (defect or misuse of judgment) → applies to the person as such. The objection attempts to move from (2) back to (1), but the antisuffrage argument clearly rests on (2): it cites voting behavior, not marital hierarchy. Therefore the disqualification is grounded in judgment, not marital/conjugal subordination. But widowhood removes only marital subordination, not judgment. Therefore it cannot remove the disqualification. QED
Proposition 7. If widows retain full civil liberties, then the premise of incapacity is implicitly denied. Proof: If widows are allowed to: own property; enter contracts; act as guardians; testify in court; litigate; then the law affirms that they possess: sufficient rational competence for binding, socially consequential decisions. But these are the same faculties required for voting. Thus: Either widows are competent → then suffrage cannot be denied on grounds of incapacity; Or widows are incompetent → then all civil liberties must be removed. Allowing one while denying the other is a contradiction. QED
Proposition 8. There is no principled basis for distinguishing widows from unmarried women under a capacity-based objection. Proof: The alleged defect (harmful political judgment) belongs to neither marriage, nor dependence, but to sexed cognition or disposition, which is shared ex hypothesi by all women alike whether married or widowed. Thus every restriction grounded in that defect must apply universally to all adult women. QED
Therefore the above objection is invalid. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Rebuttal to 2 Objections.
Objection #1. "In your very first proposition - 'All these acts influence civil order'. Before you gallop to QED, 'influence' is a tenuous claim to make; both inherently and the degree. I didn't read the remainder, the first one was already erroneous. Women shouldn't vote but shouldn't be restricted from the other activities."
Answer. The argument doesn’t depend on how much each act “influences civil order,” so challenging that word doesn’t touch the core point.
The key issue is that voting, contracting, owning property, testifying, and acting as a guardian all require the exercise of the same kind of rational, legally recognized judgment.
If women are deemed unfit for voting because their judgment is defective, then that same judgment would also be defective in contracts, testimony, and property decisions.
To maintain your position, you would need to show that voting requires a fundamentally different or higher kind of rational capacity than those other acts—not simply assert that it “influences” society more.
Thus the real point of my proposition #1 is: Voting is one species of civil agency, in that it requires the exercise of rational judgment recognized by law. Other acts—such as contracting, owning property, testifying, and guardianship—also require that same recognized capacity for judgment. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Objection #2. "Voting was historically not seen as a natural right. It wasn't universally granted to all men either. But nobody ever suggested that men who were ineligible to vote should be ineligible to own or transfer property, inherit, litigate, or form contracts. The fundamental difference here is legal agency over one's own private affairs, vs legal power over others' affairs. Testimony and guardianship are intermediate cases, but even so, an unmarried woman's natural right of parental guardianship (distinct from court-ordered legal guardianship) over her own children, born out of wedlock, was recognized. (Of course, this was contingent on her bearing sole financial responsibility for those children.) I think that this well-established, uncontroversial historical distinction (applied to men as well as women) can provide a basis for removing women from political and institutional power, while still leaving them as legal persons (femme covert vs femme sole)."
Answer. The distinction between “private affairs” and “power over others” doesn’t hold, because the so-called private rights—contract, property, testimony, and guardianship—all involve legally recognized power over other persons.
A contract binds others, property excludes others, testimony can determine legal outcomes, and guardianship is direct authority over another person. These are not merely self-regarding acts.
So the difference between these and voting is not one of kind, but of degree.
If women are said to be unfit for voting because their judgment is defective, then that same judgment is being exercised in these other domains.
As for disenfranchised men, their exclusion was typically not based on alleged incapacity, but on property or status qualifications. That places such exclusions in a different category—conventional or arbitrary—not grounded in competence.
So the argument stands: a capacity-based objection to women’s suffrage cannot be limited to voting alone without inconsistency. OBJECTION OVERRULED.
Please attempt to prove that any one of these propositions is invalid if you can !!!!
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Casus_Conscientiae
- Posts: 27
- Joined: Mon Jun 08, 2026 11:39 am
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
A Few Words on the Civil Liberties of Women (Part 2)
Tonight I have intercepted the following YouTube video: https://youtu.be/OK8UasK_wX8?si=HZwqtjgEIvBqk_A0, in which:
"This video, created by Dialectically Challenged, analyzes a recent debate on Triggernometry between Andrew Wilson, Constantine Kissen, and Francis Foster regarding whether women should have the right to vote (0:00 - 0:13).
Core Arguments:
Andrew Wilson’s Position: He advocates for a "stakeholder democracy" model where political authority and the right to vote should be directly tied to compulsory civic obligations, specifically the military draft (1:41 - 2:06, 11:35 - 12:15). He argues that because only men are beholden to the draft and the potential for combat service, there is a fundamental asymmetry in the current political system (1:21 - 1:31, 10:11 - 10:30).
The Counter-Argument: The hosts argue from a perspective of political representation and social contribution, highlighting that women face unique burdens such as childbirth and child-rearing, which they view as essential societal contributions (13:37 - 14:14, 19:31 - 19:41).
Key Takeaways:
Philosophical Conflict: The debate reveals a clash between two different foundations for political legitimacy: one based on compulsory civic duty (Wilson) and another based on universal representation (the hosts) (6:26 - 6:36, 24:04 - 24:10).
Logical Consistency: The creator of the video notes that while one may disagree with Wilson’s conclusion, his argument remains internally consistent with his premise regarding stakeholder democracy (24:16 - 24:26).
Resolution: The debate concludes amicably but remains unresolved, as the participants operate from different fundamental principles and largely talk past each other rather than engaging with the core definitions of political rights and obligations (23:53 - 24:02, 24:43 - 24:46)."
To Mr. Wilson, I answer: If political authority must be allocated according to compulsory civic obligation, and if the reason military obligation qualifies men for political authority is that it makes them responsible for maintaining and enforcing the political order, well then women who possess legally recognized authority over property, contracts, estates, wards, litigation, and testimony are already participating in the maintenance and operation of that same legal order. So then, why does military obligation distinguish the ballot from those other forms of juridical authority? Wilson might answer: “Because voting and civil personality are different things.” So therefore what is the principled difference? For example, suppose a widow: owns a farm; contracts with a merchant; hires employees; brings an action in court; gives evidence; inherits an estate; appoints or serves as guardian; petitions the Crown; and exercises custody over her children. She is plainly being recognized by the legal system as a person capable of deliberate, legally consequential action. Why does the law trust her judgment sufficiently for all these consequential acts, but declare that same judgment insufficient for the comparatively indirect act of choosing a representative? And also, what precisely distinguishes “civil office” from the ordinary exercise of civil legal authority? If a woman may not hold a public office because she lacks the requisite civic obligation, that is one proposition. But if the reason becomes: “Only persons who bear the coercive obligations of the political community may exercise governmental authority,” well then either guardianship, executorship, trusteeship, administration of estates, and other legally constituted fiduciary functions are themselves governmental or quasi-governmental functions, or else they are not. If they are, well then, Wilson must explain why women may exercise them. But if they are not, well then he has preserved his distinction—but he must explain why those functions are legally different from public office. Now a married woman can potentially be explained, within a patriarchal theory, as operating under her husband's representation. But a widow presents a different case. Suppose Wilson says: “The male citizen is politically authoritative because he bears the military obligation.” The widow responds: “I am an adult legal person. I can inherit the estate, own it, contract concerning it, sue concerning it, testify concerning it, administer it, and perhaps serve as guardian of my children. Yet because I do not bear military liability, I cannot participate in choosing the authorities whose laws regulate all those activities.” That does not prove Wilson's theory contradictory. Yet, the question now is: Why is military obligation a condition of political authority but not a condition of civil personality? And, more importantly: Why should the absence of military obligation disqualify me from political authority if it does not disqualify me from exercising other forms of legally recognized authority? Wilson has selected compulsory military obligation as the ground of political authority. But Reason demands that he show why that ground is relevant to political authority but irrelevant to every other species of juridical authority which requires the very qualities of judgment, responsibility, independence, and legal accountability that his system recognizes in women. Either: Case I: the reason women are excluded from political authority is that they lack some general capacity necessary for responsible juridical authority; or: Case II: they possess that general capacity, but political authority is nevertheless specially conditioned upon military obligation. But then in Case I, Wilson has difficulty preserving women's full civil personality, and in Case II, Wilson must abandon the claim that political exclusion follows from women's general incapacity and defend instead a special franchise qualification based upon civic obligation. Again, one cannot merely assert that political authority is uniquely conditioned upon military obligation while civil authority is governed by an entirely different principle. One needs to demonstrate the principled distinction. That puts Wilson in the same dialectical predicament as the old antisuffragist who said: “If women vote, they must fight and do police duty.” The suffragist can demand the reason. If the answer is: “Because political authority belongs only to those who bear the coercive burdens of the State,” then the suffragist asks: “Is that a rule about political franchise alone, or is it a general rule about juridical authority?” If it is general, Wilson has a serious problem with women's civil capacities. If it is limited to franchise, well then he must explain why military obligation is uniquely constitutive of the franchise but not of legal personality, property, contract, inheritance, guardianship, testimony, or other forms of juridical agency. And such is the true state of the question. What do you all say of this?
Tonight I have intercepted the following YouTube video: https://youtu.be/OK8UasK_wX8?si=HZwqtjgEIvBqk_A0, in which:
"This video, created by Dialectically Challenged, analyzes a recent debate on Triggernometry between Andrew Wilson, Constantine Kissen, and Francis Foster regarding whether women should have the right to vote (0:00 - 0:13).
Core Arguments:
Andrew Wilson’s Position: He advocates for a "stakeholder democracy" model where political authority and the right to vote should be directly tied to compulsory civic obligations, specifically the military draft (1:41 - 2:06, 11:35 - 12:15). He argues that because only men are beholden to the draft and the potential for combat service, there is a fundamental asymmetry in the current political system (1:21 - 1:31, 10:11 - 10:30).
The Counter-Argument: The hosts argue from a perspective of political representation and social contribution, highlighting that women face unique burdens such as childbirth and child-rearing, which they view as essential societal contributions (13:37 - 14:14, 19:31 - 19:41).
Key Takeaways:
Philosophical Conflict: The debate reveals a clash between two different foundations for political legitimacy: one based on compulsory civic duty (Wilson) and another based on universal representation (the hosts) (6:26 - 6:36, 24:04 - 24:10).
Logical Consistency: The creator of the video notes that while one may disagree with Wilson’s conclusion, his argument remains internally consistent with his premise regarding stakeholder democracy (24:16 - 24:26).
Resolution: The debate concludes amicably but remains unresolved, as the participants operate from different fundamental principles and largely talk past each other rather than engaging with the core definitions of political rights and obligations (23:53 - 24:02, 24:43 - 24:46)."
To Mr. Wilson, I answer: If political authority must be allocated according to compulsory civic obligation, and if the reason military obligation qualifies men for political authority is that it makes them responsible for maintaining and enforcing the political order, well then women who possess legally recognized authority over property, contracts, estates, wards, litigation, and testimony are already participating in the maintenance and operation of that same legal order. So then, why does military obligation distinguish the ballot from those other forms of juridical authority? Wilson might answer: “Because voting and civil personality are different things.” So therefore what is the principled difference? For example, suppose a widow: owns a farm; contracts with a merchant; hires employees; brings an action in court; gives evidence; inherits an estate; appoints or serves as guardian; petitions the Crown; and exercises custody over her children. She is plainly being recognized by the legal system as a person capable of deliberate, legally consequential action. Why does the law trust her judgment sufficiently for all these consequential acts, but declare that same judgment insufficient for the comparatively indirect act of choosing a representative? And also, what precisely distinguishes “civil office” from the ordinary exercise of civil legal authority? If a woman may not hold a public office because she lacks the requisite civic obligation, that is one proposition. But if the reason becomes: “Only persons who bear the coercive obligations of the political community may exercise governmental authority,” well then either guardianship, executorship, trusteeship, administration of estates, and other legally constituted fiduciary functions are themselves governmental or quasi-governmental functions, or else they are not. If they are, well then, Wilson must explain why women may exercise them. But if they are not, well then he has preserved his distinction—but he must explain why those functions are legally different from public office. Now a married woman can potentially be explained, within a patriarchal theory, as operating under her husband's representation. But a widow presents a different case. Suppose Wilson says: “The male citizen is politically authoritative because he bears the military obligation.” The widow responds: “I am an adult legal person. I can inherit the estate, own it, contract concerning it, sue concerning it, testify concerning it, administer it, and perhaps serve as guardian of my children. Yet because I do not bear military liability, I cannot participate in choosing the authorities whose laws regulate all those activities.” That does not prove Wilson's theory contradictory. Yet, the question now is: Why is military obligation a condition of political authority but not a condition of civil personality? And, more importantly: Why should the absence of military obligation disqualify me from political authority if it does not disqualify me from exercising other forms of legally recognized authority? Wilson has selected compulsory military obligation as the ground of political authority. But Reason demands that he show why that ground is relevant to political authority but irrelevant to every other species of juridical authority which requires the very qualities of judgment, responsibility, independence, and legal accountability that his system recognizes in women. Either: Case I: the reason women are excluded from political authority is that they lack some general capacity necessary for responsible juridical authority; or: Case II: they possess that general capacity, but political authority is nevertheless specially conditioned upon military obligation. But then in Case I, Wilson has difficulty preserving women's full civil personality, and in Case II, Wilson must abandon the claim that political exclusion follows from women's general incapacity and defend instead a special franchise qualification based upon civic obligation. Again, one cannot merely assert that political authority is uniquely conditioned upon military obligation while civil authority is governed by an entirely different principle. One needs to demonstrate the principled distinction. That puts Wilson in the same dialectical predicament as the old antisuffragist who said: “If women vote, they must fight and do police duty.” The suffragist can demand the reason. If the answer is: “Because political authority belongs only to those who bear the coercive burdens of the State,” then the suffragist asks: “Is that a rule about political franchise alone, or is it a general rule about juridical authority?” If it is general, Wilson has a serious problem with women's civil capacities. If it is limited to franchise, well then he must explain why military obligation is uniquely constitutive of the franchise but not of legal personality, property, contract, inheritance, guardianship, testimony, or other forms of juridical agency. And such is the true state of the question. What do you all say of this?
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Casus_Conscientiae
- Posts: 27
- Joined: Mon Jun 08, 2026 11:39 am
Re: What is the Proper Basis of Citizenship?
See my Fundamental Theorem of Taxonomy right here: viewtopic.php?t=103. It tells you all you need to know in order to understand what it takes in order for the concept of "race" to be biologically real and biologically objective.nyquistfrequency wrote: Sun Jun 14, 2026 3:44 pmThe body and station one is born into is an expression or symbol of some incorporeal essence. Which was the reason for the caste system in India. Naturally, this is the same with races, every corporeal manifestation is an approximation of some aspect of a higher order. Absolute absence is the definition of impossible and lacks all reality, so experience must continue after bodily death. However, one dies and is reborn in every moment, so what currently conditions the continuity of this life will condition the next. The soul (a particular individual essence) will find the world proper to its perceptual conditioning. Siddhartha Gautama was born a prince, Srinivasa Ramanujan was born a Brahmin. However, there are many incompetents born of high status and many geniuses of low birth, how does one explain this? This is what I suspect has happened, the mixing has gotten to the point where nearly everyone has fragments of noble blood, yet few have the capacity to use it to its full potential. The opposite can be true as well, if the biology is malfunctioning, it can no longer reflect the soul's intent properly. It can also be the case that one can unlock latent capacities (siddhis) by resolving some ignorance (original sin).Koentek wrote: Sat Jun 13, 2026 3:29 pmThank you for informing me of the concept of the race of the soul, it is the first time I have come across that. It is undeniable that en masse a group of a particular ethnos gives rise to a particular culture — the extent to which this culture can be said to be downstream of genetics, I do not know.nyquistfrequency wrote: Sat Jun 13, 2026 9:16 am What koentek said reminds me of the race of the soul.
"The body is the externality of the soul and the soul is the race seen from the inside."
However, "there are many cases of people who are exactly of the same race of the body, of the same tribe, sometimes even, brothers or fathers and sons, of the same blood in the most real sense, but who nevertheless fail to understand each other. A barrier separates their souls, their way of feeling and seeing is different, and the common race of the body and common blood can do nothing about that. A possibility of comprehension exists, and therefore of true solidarity, of deep unity, only where a common “race of the soul” exists."
This article does a decent summary:
https://gornahoor.net/?p=8105
It is always the case that like seeks like, however, racial purity is not purely physical. So how does one integrate or select for members of a nation in the natal sense? How does one prevent a decline in racial quality?
Truthfully, I have not delved deep into ethnonationalist circles but a general truth I see be implied is that not every single member of a race exhibits behaviours characteristic of that race yet I have never seen a metaphysical explanation to why that may be the case.
Ultimately I defer to scripture which I believe does indeed group individual members of nations together e.g. the collective punishment of Egypt in Book of Exodus. But ultimately the Imago Dei and the stain of Original Sin greatly diminish the credit that can be given to prosperity arising from one's race.
Nyquistfrequency, what do you think of the division of humans into biological races?
This is just somewhat speculative so far.
"It is certainly true that all composite substances are liable to decomposition: that this decomposition, when it takes place in the animal world, is called death: and that the human body is a substance compounded of the four elements. But it is also true that the elements of Paradise, where man is created, are not subject to this law, seeing that they are most pure and incorruptible heavenly essences; and if man had remained in this pure and celestial region, his body would be incapable of natural decay. Adam, however, in an evil day for our race, disobeyed the Creator, and straightaway was driven forth to the beasts, into the world of corruptible elements which God had created for the beasts only. From that day forward his food was derived from perishable substances, and death began to work in his members. The pure elements of his creation were gradually mingled and infected with the corruptible elements of the outer world and thus his body became more and more gross, and liable, through its grossness, to natural decay and death. The process of degeneration was, of course, slow in the case of Adam and his first descendants; but, as time went on, the seed out of which men were generated became more and more infected with perishable elements. The continued use of corruptible food rendered their bodies more and more gross - and human life was soon shortened to a very brief span indeed."
There is no evolution, life involved, percipitated/solidified out of an amorphous superbeing, pure potential became more and more constrained by form, things were previously less physical less substance and more essence, less successive "how" (perishable) and more simultaneous "why" (immutable). So a bacterium did not evolve into a fish did not evolve into a monkey which evolved into a human. This "evolution" would mean one could derive the whole from the part which is impossible. A thing cannot become other than what it is. Rather the ape is the degeneration of the human.
Adaptation is always a specialization and therefore a limitation of scope/potential. Mutation is simply a degeneration. All forms of specialization implies loss of potential, one cannot specialize one's way to an increased capacity. The degeneration catalyzed by inbreeding is already present on a macro scale, all biology is a machine trying to repair itself while forgetting itself. This is the case with aging and cancer is forgetting at a cellular level. All degeneration is forgetting the principle which governs one existence. We can see that this theory immediately aligns to the long lifespans mentioned in the bible, things were not as solidified and mechanized, there was a greater connection to God so people lived longer, possessed greater health, probably also had remarkable healing abilities, since nothing was forgotten it could simply be regenerated.
What we see of the various races are various stages of degeneration, apes are degenerated humans and monkeys are degenerated apes. It's called the descent of man and not the ascent of man for a reason. So this presents the character of a racial hierarchy of those closer to the Principle and those further away.